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SPEAKING OF SCIENCE: INTRODUCING NOTICE AND COMMENT 
INTO THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
 




Congress enacts, on a nearly continuous basis, a variety of laws 
that affect scientific research and progress. Some of these laws have an 
unquestionably positive effect. For instance, Congress’s creation of the 
National Institutes of Health, the National Academy of Sciences, and 
NASA; its various appropriations to fund ground-breaking research; and 
a multitude of other laws have incalculably advanced human knowledge, 
and it is to Congress’s great credit that these laws have been and are 
continuing to be enacted. However, not all laws that affect the progress 
of sciences are an unalloyed good. Quite the opposite, often the laws aim 
to, and in fact do, retard the progress of scientific research. The question 
is then whether the benefit from those laws outweighs the costs imposed 
on scientific progress. 
Congress, however, often does not fully consider the costs that the 
legislation imposes on science, either for lack of information or as a 
result of conscious disregard for the views of a politically insignificant 
group. The public is not able to hold Congress accountable because it 
lacks an ability to participate in the process and lacks an objective basis 
against which to measure congressional action. The problem is not 
congressional malfeasance or ignorance but rather the structure of the 
legislative process itself. The general public is often taught and told that 
lawmaking is a process that begins in a committee where the proposal is 
carefully studied, debated, amended, and voted on. The reality, of course, 
is much different. First, bills often skip the committee process, and 
amendments are often added last minute without a chance for a 
meaningful debate. But even where the process is followed, it is often 
hard to portray the committee hearings as a true deliberative process. 
Instead, they are often described as a Kabuki theater, where the Chair 
and the Ranking Member designate the witnesses they wish to call to 
support the preformulated position. Interested parties cannot provide 
testimony unless asked to do so by the relevant committee. Thus, 
oftentimes the people with the deepest knowledge, but low political skills, 
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are cut out of the process. The end result is that Congress votes on 
legislation without fully understanding the implication thereof. The 
voters also are injured in that it is hard to hold Congress accountable if 
one cannot point out that it ignored the views of the scientific 
communities. 
This Article proposes a solution to the problem. Bills that affect the 
progress of science ought to be evaluated by an independent body 
similar to the Congressional Budget Office. Like the CBO, this body 
would not have any authority to block a bill, but it would be able to 
“score” it (i.e., provide information on the effect the bill will have on 
research). In order to accomplish its task, this newly created body would 
be required to provide notice of pending legislation and then seek 
comments from the interested parties, much like what is done in the 
administrative rulemaking process. The comments then would be 
collected and analyzed, and the final report would be presented to 
Congress before it votes. Congress would continue to be able to vote as it 
pleases, but with this process in place, it would be forced to do so with 
its eyes wide open. By understanding the full scope and the implication 
for the scientific progress of the bills it wishes to enact, Congress would 
produce better legislation, which would be less detrimental to the 
scientific progress. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Otto von Bismarck is rumored to have quipped that “legislation is like 
sausage: it’s better not to watch it being made.”1 It may well have been sound 
advice when the laws were made in service of a monarchy without much 
consideration of the views or desires of the populace. Americans, however, “have 
ignored this advice and have widely subscribed to the view that a truly democratic 
people must have access to governmental decision-making . . . .”2 Yet, despite an 
expectation of public participation, in reality the public is often shut out from the 
legislative process. This exclusion creates three distinct though interrelated 
problems, especially when Congress legislates in areas that deal with science and 
technology. First, when Congress legislates in these areas, it tends to prove 
Bismarck correct because it legislates in the dark, without understanding the 
underlying issues or the full impact that legislation is likely to have on the progress 
1 Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative 
Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 870 n.28 (2002). The quote is likely apocryphal, but it is 
oft quoted by lawyers and judges alike, despite there being no definitive proof that 
Bismarck actually uttered these words. Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., Newgarth Revisited: 
Mrs. Robinson’s Case, 49 S.C. L. REV. 407, 412 n.18 (1998).  
2 James Bowen, Behind Closed Doors: Re-Examining the Tennessee Open Meetings 
Act and Its Inapplicability to the Tennessee General Assembly, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 133, 133 (2002). 
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of sciences.3 Second, even when Congress is aware of the potential negative effect 
that the legislation will have on the progress of sciences, it often prefers not to 
acknowledge that effect, instead focusing on the benefits that the bill would bring 
to certain political constituencies.4 This lack of recognition of the negative effects 
in turn diminishes Congress’s democratic accountability because Congress never 
faces a definitive warning about the scientific effects of its legislative activity. In 
other words, the fact that Congress ignored a warning from experts would allow 
the public to conclude that a law’s negative effects were not “unintended 
consequences,” but instead, a case of willful disregard of expert opinion. Third, the 
current legislative process tends to diminish trust in the system because the 
affected parties do not believe that they had opportunities to convey their concerns 
or that their concerns were considered. The solution, however, is not to avert our 
gaze, as Bismarck recommended, but to improve the process so that the result is as 
worthy as sausages are tasty. 
Congress enacts, on a nearly continuous basis, a variety of laws that affect 
scientific research and progress. Some of these laws have an unquestionably 
positive effect. For instance, Congress’s creation of the National Institutes of 
Health,5 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),6 and NASA;7 its various 
appropriations to fund ground-breaking research;8 and a multitude of other laws 
have incalculably advanced human knowledge, and it is to Congress’s great credit 
that these laws have been and are continuing to be enacted. However, not all laws 
that affect the progress of sciences are an unalloyed good. Quite the opposite, often 
3 See Cornelia Dean, Groups Call for Scientists to Engage the Body Politic, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, at D1 (“[A]ccording to the Congressional Research Service, the 
technically trained among the 435 members of the House include one physicist, 22 people 
with medical training (including 2 psychologists and a veterinarian), a chemist, a 
microbiologist and 6 engineers.”). 
4 Cf. Megan Creek Frient, Note, Similar Harm Means Similar Claims: Doing Away 
with Davis v. Bandemer’s Discriminatory Effect Requirement in Political Gerrymandering 
Cases, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 617, 644–45 (1998) (“Since the incumbent from the 
politically gerrymandered district knows he or she represents an area which has been 
crafted so that a majority of the residents share his or her political views, the representative 
has no incentive to acknowledge other voters’ concerns: Safe districts remove the incentive 
to grant political concessions to constituent interests or create electoral coalitions [that] 
ensure representation of diverse points of view. In fact, granting the minority party’s point 
of view deference in a gerrymandered district would be foolish. The representative would 
risk offending the constituents whose support the district was designed to guarantee.” 
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
5 Ransdell Act, Pub. L. No. 71-251, 46 Stat. 379–80 (1930). 
6 Act to Incorporate The National Academy of Sciences, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 803, 806 
(1863). 
7 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426 
(current version at 51 U.S.C. § 20103 (Supp. IV 2010)).  
8 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 
(2011); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3 (2004). 
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the laws aim to, and in fact do, retard the progress of scientific research.9 The 
question is, then, whether the benefit from those laws outweighs the costs imposed 
on scientific progress. At one extreme, consider the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.10 
The treaty certainly had the effect of limiting the study of nuclear physics.11 Yet, 
there is some value in banning nuclear tests, and Congress has attempted to strike a 
balance between the two.12 The problem is that too many laws are enacted without 
any serious consideration of these costs and benefits because these laws are written 
and passed without the full understanding or acknowledgment of the impact that 
they will have on scientific research.13 
These problems can be ameliorated by furnishing unbiased scientific analysis 
to Congress, provided that such analysis is furnished in a language that is both 
neutral and comprehensible to an average member of Congress. Members of 
Congress, of course, would not be obliged to change their vote on the basis of any 
particular report, but the very presence of such a report would provide a solid 
political basis on which to evaluate the member’s commitment to science and 
scientific progress. Furthermore, to the extent that Congress deliberately rejects 
9 See Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 
GEO. L.J. 1341, 1366 (1987) (“To give examples of legal restrictions on technology is to 
survey much of modern American law. . . . Food and drug law has become recognized as a 
discrete area of study that includes cases where new products have been delayed in 
reaching the market or prevented from doing so altogether. In other areas, ranging from 
communications to computers, regulation is a fact of modern life. At the state level, statutes 
and judicial decisions, concerning, for example, malpractice, products liability, and 
exposure to radioactive materials, have subjected technology to extraordinarily close 
scrutiny.”). 
10 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. 
11 See Winston P. Nagan & Erin K. Slemmens, Developing U.S. Nuclear Weapons 
Policy and International Law: The Approach of the Obama Administration, 19 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 41, 76 (2010) (“[T]he nuclear weapons problem is one that deeply 
implicates science and technology. A relevant role from modern international law is to 
come to grips with the possibilities and limitations of science and technology in order to 
provide the goal guidance that is both relevant and steeped in realism.”); Eric Schmitt, 
Experts Say Test Ban Could Impair Nuclear-Arms Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at 
A11.  
12 For example, the United States ratified the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra 
note 10, but balked at ratifying the new Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. See 145 
CONG. REC. 25,143 (1999) (rejecting the Treaty by a vote of forty-eight to fifty-one). One 
of the reasons for the opposition to the Treaty was the stated effect on scientific testing. See 
Schmitt, supra note 11. 
13 See Valerie M. Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the Regulation of 
Biotechnology Research, 17 ENVTL. L. 183, 191–92 (1987) (“Scientists argue that risks of 
experimentation in biotechnology cannot be discussed rationally unless participants 
understand the subject matter. . . . According to many scientists, rapidly-moving research 
simply is not amenable to safety regulations by nonscientific decision makers. . . . Public 
participants in scientific discussions tend to be intimidated by scientists, and are hesitant to 
raise technical issues for fear of embarrassment.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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warnings provided in any such analysis, the judiciary will be able to better evaluate 
whether Congress actually meant to reach what may in a vacuum be viewed as 
“absurd results.”14 In other words, if Congress actually considered a particular 
result and determined that the occurrence of such a result is not problematic, the 
courts would then be hard pressed to hold that this very result is “absurd.” This 
Article proposes the creation of an advisory body—the Congressional Scientific 
Office—that would be able to provide unbiased scientific advice to members of 
Congress with respect to any pending bill or amendment. Such an advisory body 
would greatly improve the legislative process, as well as have a beneficial effect on 
the ability of the public to hold their elected representatives accountable for the 
votes these representatives cast. 
Part II discusses what the general public often learns about the lawmaking 
process versus the actual reality of the process. According to civics textbooks, the 
lawmaking process begins in a committee where the proposal is carefully studied, 
debated, amended, and voted on. Then, the process is repeated on the floor of the 
House of Representatives and then again, from scratch, in the Senate. The reality, 
of course, is much different. First, bills often skip the committee process, and 
amendments are often added last minute without a chance for a meaningful debate. 
But even where the process is followed, it is often hard to portray the committee 
hearings as a true deliberative process. Instead, they are often described as a 
Kabuki theater,15 where the chair and the ranking member designate the witnesses 
they wish to call to support the preformulated position.16 Interested parties cannot 
provide testimony unless asked to do so by the relevant committee.17 Thus, 
14 See generally Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) 
(engaging in statutory interpretation by looking at the implicated statute’s words and 
viewing Congress’s petitions and testimony behind the statute in order to analyze whether 
the congressional intent of the statute was the actual result or if such a result was absurd).  
15 See Caprice L. Roberts, Discretion & Deference in Senate Consideration of 
Judicial Nominations, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 6 (2012). While most criticisms focus 
on nomination, especially judicial nomination hearings, legislative hearings are little 
different. See infra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
16 Lisa O. Monaco, Comment, Give the People What They Want: The Failure of 
“Responsive” Lawmaking, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 735, 761–62 (1996) (“Because 
of the unique control that committee chairs have over the design and content of hearings—
including who testifies and on what—testimony at hearings may be viewed as simply an 
additional forum for interest group influence in the form of witnesses. It is up to the chair 
to decide the extent to which individuals will be heard by the committee or to which their 
written views will be placed in the committee record. . . . In general, the committee chair 
retains power to set the agenda and format of any hearings and determine all witnesses in 
consultation with the ranking member of the minority party on the committee.”). 
17 See Clay Calvert, The First Amendment, the Media and the Culture Wars: Eight 
Important Lessons From 2004 About Speech, Censorship, Science and Public Policy, 41 
CAL. W. L. REV. 325, 341–47 (2005) (describing a hearing on adult industry where only 
scientists opposed to pornography were invited to participate, but those holding contrary 
views or questioning the basis of the studies presented to the committee were not); Peter 
DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34 
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oftentimes, the people with the deepest knowledge are cut out of the process,18 
either because their views do not fit the preformulated agenda or because the 
information they convey cannot, in any event, be processed by nonexpert 
congressmen. The end result is that Congress votes on legislation without fully 
understanding the implications thereof.19 The voters are also injured because it is 
hard to hold Congress accountable if one cannot point out that it ignored the views 
of the scientific communities.20 
Part III discusses a specific example of uninformed legislating and its effect 
on scientific progress. The Dickey-Wicker Amendment was enacted in 1996 as 
part of the annual appropriation process.21 The Amendment bars federal funding 
for any research on a human embryo, which is in turn defined as any organism 
“derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from one or 
more human gametes.”22 This rider was enacted without any separate vote on the 
issue and was attached to “must-pass” legislation.23 It has been reenacted every 
year since 1996.24 The problem is that in enacting this legislation, no one 
considered whether differences between fertilization, cloning, and parthenogenesis 
exist, and if so, whether they are of sufficient magnitude to treat each process 
differently.25 As it turns out, such differences do exist,26 yet they were not taken 
CARDOZO L. REV. 173, 189 (2012) (“[T]he information Congress receives . . . is limited by 
the set of parties invited to participate.”). 
18 Cf. Monaco, supra note 16, at 762 (“[W]itnesses reflecting minority viewpoints are 
often heard from last and end up speaking to few Members and empty hearing rooms.”). 
19 See Fogleman, supra note 13, at 189–92. 
20 Lotte E. Feinberg, Open Government and Freedom of Information: Fishbowl 
Accountability?, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 375–77 (Philip J. 
Cooper & Chester A. Newland eds., 1997) (stating that for electoral accountability, 
“citizens must have access to information about what their government is doing and how 
decisions have been reached”); see also Joseph S. Alonzo, Restoring the Ideal 
Marketplace: How Recognizing Bloggers as Journalists Can Save the Press, 9 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 751, 752 (2006) (“Broad availability of information is an essential 
element of a strong democracy—quality collective decision-making and electoral 
accountability both depend upon an informed polity.”).  
21 Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 
(1996). 
22 Id. 
23 See Omnibus FY96 Bill Ties Loose Ends, in 52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, at 10-5, 10-19 
(1996) (discussing the background of the 1996 Omnibus Appropriations). 
24 O. Carter Snead, Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration, 43 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1529, 1546 (2010). 
25 As discussed in Part III, the bill was written, considered, passed, and signed within 
forty-eight hours, leaving essentially no time to debate the merits of any of its provisions. 
See Bill Summary & Status, 104th Congress (1995–1996), H.R. 2880, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=BSS&c=104 (search 
“Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I” and select first link).  
26 See generally Sarah Rodriguez et al., An Obscure Rider Obstructing Science: The 
Conflation of Parthenotes with Embryos in the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, 11 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 20 (2011) (describing how parthenogenesis is scientifically and ethically 
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into account, precisely because no one asked the right question, there was no one 
in the room to answer it, and perhaps the sponsors of legislation did not want to 
hear the answer. The Dickey-Wicker Amendment has stymied research in areas 
such as fertility, assisted reproductive technologies, and stem cells, all because of 
Congress’s basic lack of understanding of the underlying scientific principles.27 
Part IV of the Article proposes a solution to the problem. Bills that affect the 
progress of science ought to be evaluated by an independent body similar to the 
Congressional Budget Office.28 Like the CBO, this body would not have any 
authority to block a bill, but it would be able to “score” it (i.e., provide information 
on the effect the bill will have on research).29 In order to accomplish its task, this 
newly created body would be required to provide notice of pending legislation and 
then seek comments from the interested parties, much like what is done in the 
administrative rulemaking process.30 The comments would then be collected and 
analyzed with the final report presented to Congress before it votes. Congress will 
continue to be able to vote as it pleases, but with this process in place, it will be 
forced to do so with its eyes wide open. By understanding the full scope and the 
implication for the scientific progress of the bills it wishes to enact, Congress will 
produce better legislation, which will be less detrimental to scientific progress. If 
representatives choose to ignore the opinions of experts, voters will be able to hold 
their representatives accountable.  
 
II.  THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: MYTHS AND REALITIES 
 
Millions of Americans think of the legislative process by reference to 
Schoolhouse Rock’s I’m Just a Bill31 and Jimmy Stewart’s Mr. Smith Goes to 
Washington.32 The process that is imprinted in the public’s mind is one with 
exhaustive debates in the committees and on the floor, where the views of people, 
most likely to be affected by the legislation and most knowledgeable in the subject 
matter, provide input to Congress before a congressional determination is made.33 
This view is bolstered by congressional webpages that list committees and their 
areas of jurisdiction, congressional mailings touting a particular individual’s 
different from fertilization and cloning and that Congress should consider removing 
parthenogenesis from the Dickey-Wicker Amendment). 
27 See id.  
28 For the history and the description of the functions of the Congressional Budget 
Office, see generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET OFFICE (2012) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION], available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/2012-IntroToCBO.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
29 See id. at 1–3. 
30 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (describing the notice-and-comment process within the 
administrative agencies). 
31 Schoolhouse Rock!: I’m Just a Bill (ABC television broadcast 1975), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FFroMQlKiag.  
32 MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1939). 
33 See, e.g., Schoolhouse Rock!: I’m Just a Bill, supra note 31. 
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membership on a certain committee that is supposedly relevant to the specific 
concerns of the congressman’s district, and even C-SPAN programming that 
shows committee hearings where congressmen and senators hear testimony and 
question proponents and opponents of proposed bills. With such media 
presentations, the public can be forgiven for thinking that each bill undergoes 
serious scrutiny and debate before being voted on and enacted into law. The 
reality, however, is quite different. 
In the last few years, congressional hearings have often been called “Kabuki 
theater”34 or a “dog and pony show.”35 While the moniker is most often applied to 
the judicial confirmation hearings,36 the same is true about all other hearings.37 The 
hearings are no longer designed to elicit unbiased expert testimony to aid the 
deliberative process, but rather to provide support for preexisting political 
viewpoints.38 The appearance of witnesses in the congressional hearings is not a 
matter of right for the public, but a matter of prerogative for committee chairs and 
ranking members.39 The chairman is a particularly powerful figure in the 
committee with the authority to decide not only which proposals are considered 
and in what order (or for that matter whether they are considered at all), but also 
which witnesses he will call and to what they will testify.40 
The exercise of this power was on display when the late Senator Jesse Helms, 
the then-Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, refused to hold 
hearings on the nomination of William Weld to be the U.S. Ambassador to 
34 See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Judicial Independence, Judicial Virtue, and the Political 
Economy of the Constitution, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 59 (2012); Editorial, How 
Conservative Is Judge Roberts?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A30 (quoting then-Senator 
Joe Biden describing the hearings as a “Kabuki dance”). 
35 Indiana State Bar Association Conference on Relations Between Congress and the 
Federal Courts: A Stenographic Record, 41 IND. L. REV. 305, 327 (2008) [hereinafter 
Indiana State Bar] (“I find this for me more helpful than a congressional hearing and what 
some would call a dog and pony show, which is what a lot of the hearings turn out to be.”) 
(quoting Congressman Brad Ellsworth); Michael A. McCann, Antitrust, Governance, and 
Postseason College Football, 52 B.C. L. REV. 517, 541 n.147 (2011) (describing some 
congressional hearings on sports investigation as “dog-and-pony shows” created to attract 
media attention).  
36 See supra note 34. 
37 See Indiana State Bar, supra note 35. 
38 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
39 Id. 
40 Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in 
Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 344–45 n.99 (1998) (“Power is 
particularly concentrated in the hands of committee chairs, who hold sway over the 
committees’ agendas and the bills reported to the floor.”); see also Richard H. Pildes & 
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value 
Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2137 (1990) (noting that 
committee chairs control the agenda and that “[t]he rules for setting the agenda become a 
powerful means for manipulating a divided legislature to converge on those outcomes 
favored by the agenda setters”). 
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Mexico.41 When Senator Helms’s Republican colleagues rebelled against this 
approach, Senator Helms was forced to hold a hearing.42 However, at that hearing, 
it was not Governor Weld who testified in support of his nomination.43 Rather, 
Senator Helms engaged in a soliloquy about the Senate traditions of allowing the 
committee chairmen to refuse to bring up matters for hearings or votes and then 
adjourned the hearing when he was done.44 
A committee chairman also has the authority to draft a bill on his own and 
have that bill form the basis of discussions, rather than what may have been 
debated in a subcommittee or during the initial hearings in the full committee.45 
Thus, the chairman has a near complete control of the scope and substance of 
discussion that takes place in the committee.46 
The modern absurdity of committee hearings is perhaps best illustrated by the 
appearance of the comedian Stephen Colbert in front of the House Judiciary 
Committee in September of 2010.47 Mr. Colbert used the opportunity to mock 
Congress and the process of considering bills.48 Mr. Colbert, however, did not just 
arrive at the hearing room unannounced. He was invited by the subcommittee 
Chair, the long-serving Representative Zoe Lofgren.49 Instead of a real debate on 
the merits of the Farm Bill, the committee (and by extension, the public) was 
treated to a mocking performance of a satirist.50 
41 Richard L. Berke & Steven Lee Myers, In Washington, Few Trifle with Jesse 
Helms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/02/us/in-washington-
few-trifle-with-jesse-helms.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
42 Katharine Q. Seelye, With Iron Gavel, Helms Rejects Vote on Weld, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 1997, at A1. 
43 Id.  
44 Ultimately, Governor Weld was never brought up for a vote, and his nomination 
was withdrawn. William Neikirk, Weld Whiffs on Helms Hardball, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 
1997, at 1. 
45 See Glossary of Congressional Terms > C, THECAPITOL.NET, http://www.thecap 
itol.net/glossary/c.htm#Chairman’sMark/Staff Draft (defining “Chairman’s Mark” as a 
“[r]ecommendation by committee (or subcommittee) chair of the measure to be considered 
in a markup, usually drafted as a bill”) (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
46 See supra note 40. 
47 C-SPAN: Stephen Colbert’s Opening Statement (C-SPAN 3 television broadcast 
Sept. 24, 2010), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k1T75jBYeCs.  
48 See id.; see also Jonathan Allen, Colbert Knocks Dems Off Message, POLITICO.COM 
(Sept. 24, 2010, 4:57 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0910/42692.html (“David 
Corn, who writes for the liberal Mother Jones magazine, tweeted ‘Colbert is making a 
mockery of this hearing.’ Republicans were more harsh.”). 
49 Nicole Allan, Stephen Colbert Testifies in Congress, in Character, THE ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 24, 2010, 12:07 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/09/stephen-
colbert-testifies-in-congress-in-character/63507/. 
50 See Michael D. Shear & Ashley Parker, The Caucus; A Comic Twist On Political 
Chatter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950D 
E1D71231F936A1575AC0A9669D8B63.  
                                                     
252 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
What’s more, committee hearings are rarely fully attended by the committee 
members.51 In some ways, this is not surprising given that each member of 
Congress serves on a number of committees.52 The supposed deliberations then are 
actually quite often just a show, with most of the work done not out in the open by 
the people responsible to the electorate, but by the staffers.53 While staffers may 
consult with experts in the field,54 they need not do so, and even when they do 
consult—because whatever advice is obtained comes through private 
communications—there is little chance to test these communications against 
criticism and opposing viewpoints.55 Instead, the more likely outcome is epistemic 
closure where the preplanned political outcome is justified by reference to 
selective presentation of information and arguments.56 Congressional committees 
then are not the deliberative and fact-finding bodies portrayed in Schoolhouse 
Rock videos, but rather are rubber-stamps for prewritten bills. Indeed courts have 
often disregarded congressional findings of fact57 precisely because quite often 
51 Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 
84 IND. L.J. 1, 41 (2009) (“The very conduct of the committee hearings undermines any 
serious examination of the facts; attendance is often poor, and during the testimony 
legislators frequently talk to one another, wander in and out to take phone calls, and engage 
in side conversations with their staff.”). 
52 Marvin C. Ott, Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight, 16 INT’L J. 
INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 69, 87 (2003) (noting that members of Congress 
“have multiple committee assignments and, under the best of circumstances, have difficulty 
giving adequate time and attention to any one of them”). 
53 See, e.g., William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional 
Prescription for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 202, 237 (1987) (“The Committee, however, had not completed the final text of the 
bill and left the task of drafting the appropriate language to its staff.”); Edward L. Rubin, 
Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 
285 (1991) (“The drafting can be done by the legislator’s own staff, as Truth-in-Lending 
was, or by a centralized staff of one kind or another, such as committee counsel, legislative 
counsel, or a separate research office . . . .”). 
54 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried 
About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 552 (2008) (“Members of Congress and their staffs 
are most vulnerable to the problematic methods because of their reliance on reelection, the 
often temporary nature of their government service, and their ability to have closed door 
meetings with lobbyists that protect the information they receive from outside scrutiny.” 
(footnote omitted)); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative 
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 584 (2002) (relating a 
staffer’s experience of “reworking a long-pending constitutional amendment drafted in 
consultation with legal scholars, policy experts, and representatives of law enforcement”). 
55 See Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think About the Constitution when 
Enacting the Affordable Care Act, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 261, 266–67 (2012) 
(noting that the minority party is often unable “to call witnesses or otherwise define the 
hearing agenda”); Mayer, supra note 54, at 552. 
56 See Mayer, supra note 54, at 552. 
57 See, e.g., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (rejecting Congress’s findings 
of fact and noting that they “are substantially weakened by the fact that they rely so heavily 
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these findings are tendentious, open to much dispute, and sometimes are not even 
supported by actual evidence.58 
This situation would be bad enough, but that is merely the beginning of 
failures in the legislative process. Several additional factors ensure the bills that 
come up for votes on the floor of each house are not subject to full debate, 
scrutiny, and relevant data. In the House of Representatives, before being reported 
to the floor, each bill has to be considered and reported by the Committee on 
Rules.59 Whereas the various committees with subject matter jurisdiction are at 
least nominally specialized—with representatives assigned based on specific 
interest in the matters within committee’s jurisdiction and staffers being drawn 
from the pool of individuals with specialized knowledge in these matters—the 
Rules Committee is a purely political tool designed to allow the Speaker of the 
House to keep control of the bills brought to the floor.60 The Rules Committee’s 
power over all bills is nearly limitless: 
 
The [Rules] Committee has the authority to do virtually anything 
during the course of consideration of a measure, including deeming it 
passed. The Committee can also include a self-executed amendment 
which could rewrite just parts of a bill, or the entire measure. In essence, 
so long as a majority of the House is willing to vote for a special rule, 
there is little that the Rules Committee cannot do.61 
 
Despite this power, the Committee does not spend much time considering the 
bills that it reports to the floor.62 Nor does it often hear outsiders’ testimony.63 
Instead, the individuals testifying before the Rules Committee are usually other 
members of Congress that urge the committee to allow (or disallow) consideration 
of certain amendments on the House floor.64 Despite the lack of deep familiarity or 
the factual background behind the bills, the Rules Committee can—and does—
rewrite bills it considers, even when such bills have been painstakingly developed 
on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if we are to maintain 
the Constitution’s enumeration of powers”). 
58 See Borgmann, supra note 51, at 40. 
59 See About the Committee on Rules—History and Processes, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON RULES, http://rules.house.gov/about (last visited Feb. 28, 
2014). 
60 See id. 
61 Id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. (“Rules Committee holds a hearing where the witnesses are the Members of 
the House who sit on the committee of jurisdiction or want to offer amendments.”). 
64 See id. 
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in the committee of jurisdiction.65 This makes the final product even less 
deliberative and more political—in the worst sense of the word.66 
The Senate does not have a counterpart to the House Rules Committee.67 
Nonetheless, the Senate has its own methods of skirting committees of jurisdiction. 
The Senate majority leader controls the Senate’s calendar.68 The majority leader 
decides when to call up each bill, irrespective of whether it has been fully vetted 
(or for that matter, vetted at all) by the committee of jurisdiction.69 In other words, 
a bill can be written, introduced, and then immediately called up for consideration, 
thus bypassing any hearings or opportunity—such as it is—for interested members 
of the public to offer their views and criticism.70 To be fair, the Senate rules do 
allow senators to force extended—and nearly limitless—debate on any bill, thus 
providing a bit of a safety check against bills being rushed through without due 
consideration.71 That said, the length of the debate and speechifying—often to an 
otherwise empty chamber72—does not necessarily enhance the quality of the 
debate or allow experts, individuals, or groups most affected by the proposed 
legislation to offer their views or describe the likely effect the proposed legislation 
will have. 
Related to the aforementioned problems is the fact that Congress has, over the 
decades, blurred the traditional line between authorizing legislation and 
65 See Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of Deliberative 
Democracy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 321, 358–63 
(1993); U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON RULES, supra note 59. 
66 See generally Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 65 (asserting that current 
congressional policy-making practices are breaking down the basis of deliberative 
democracy). 
67 The Senate does have a Committee on Rules and Administration, but its jurisdiction 
is significantly narrower than that of its House counterpart. The Senate Committee deals 
only with the administration of the Senate itself, as well as bills on a specific and rather 
limited basis. See About the Committee, COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., http://www.rules.sen 
ate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PurposeJurisdiction (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
68 VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT 96-548, THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE SENATE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (2013), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%26*2D4Q%5CK3%0A (“The 
Senate gives its majority leader the primary responsibility for deciding the order in which 
bills on the calendar should come to the floor for action.”). 
69 Id. at 6. 
70 Id. (noting that Senate Rule XIV allows any senator to bypass referral to 
committee, but because the majority leader controls the calendar, that power is only 
effective with respect to the bills that the majority leader wishes to have debated on the 
floor). 
71 See Standing Rules of the Senate r. XXII, in COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., SENATE 
MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 112-1, r. XXII, at 1, 20–22 (2011). This is the rule that permits the 
process known as filibuster as it allows the debate to be shut off only if three-fifths of the 
elected senators vote to end debate. Id. 
72 See Stuart Banner, Trials and Other Entertainment, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1285, 
1288 (2011) (“On C-Span today, you can watch politicians giving speeches before what 
look like completely empty chambers.”). 
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appropriating legislation. Professor Richard Lazarus describes the distinction 
between the two types of bills and the consequences that flow from each: 
 
The decision whether to pass authorizing legislation, such as the 
Clean Air Act, its detailed amendments, or any other kind of 
substantive legislation, is almost always entirely discretionary. 
Because relatively few federal statutes . . . have sunset provisions, 
congressional failure to pass a new authorization statute preserves 
the status quo. The absence of legislative action does not create a 
disruptive legal vacuum. Congress need not formally reauthorize 
either the Clean Water Act or the Clean Air Act after a statutorily 
prescribed number of years for those laws to remain in effect. 
Hence, those seeking to pass a new authorization statute invariably 
face the heavy burden of demonstrating why a change is 
necessary. 
Precisely the converse is true when appropriations legislation 
is at stake. There is enormous political pressure to pass annual 
appropriations legislation because, absent its passage, the status 
quo is not maintained. Instead, there is a very real threat of a 
complete shutdown of the federal government. If the deadline for 
the annual appropriations bill is not met, then to avoid a shutdown 
Congress must at a minimum pass a continuing resolution to 
appropriate funds for a few more weeks or months as necessary to 
keep an agency in operation until passage of the annual 
appropriations bill.73 
 
As a result of the “must-pass” nature of the appropriation bills, “it is tempting 
to try to attach incidental provisions that otherwise might lack the political 
momentum (or even majority support) necessary for passage.”74 These riders can 
often be no different than stand-alone “substantive” bills, but because they are 
attached to appropriation bills, rather than authorization legislation, they are not 
considered in the committee of jurisdiction over the substantive matter. If they are 
considered in the committee at all, it is in the Committee on Appropriations.75 
Quite often, these riders are not even considered in the Appropriations Committee, 
but rather are added last minute during the floor debates and votes.76 Again, in 
either case, the legislators are deprived of the considered views of those whom the 
legislation is likely to affect.77 
73 Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative 
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 634–35 (2006).  
74 Id. at 635. 
75 See id. at 636. Of course, any rider that is part of the annual appropriations bill 
would expire at the same time as the underlying bill would. Thus, such riders would have 
to be renewed from year to year if they are to continue in force. 
76 See id. at 648–53. 
77 See id. 
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A final stage at which bills can be amended without much public input or 
debate is a conference committee formed to negotiate over different versions of a 
bill passed by the House and the Senate.78 Much like the House of 
Representative’s Committee on Rules, conference committees have an almost 
unlimited authority to rewrite or modify a pending bill,79 and they can do so in 
near-total secrecy,80 for meetings of conference committees are generally not open 
to the public, at least not for the purposes of giving testimony and illuminating the 
full scope of effects that the bill (or any modifications thereto) would have.81 
In short, the informed, deliberative process that the public is taught to expect 
is quite often anything but that. Instead, the process is often much more haphazard, 
ill-informed, and subject to hijacking by individuals who may not understand the 
full impact of the very legislation for which they support and vote. Furthermore, 
the current process allows congressmen to obscure and obfuscate politically 
inconvenient facts. By refusing to bring forth witnesses, Congress can create 
legislative history that is willfully barren of countervailing facts. In those 
situations, the problem is not that congressmen do not understand the implications 
of the legislation, but that they willfully refuse to acknowledge those implications.  
This degradation of the deliberative process has several effects. It results in 
legislators being presented with limited and incomplete information and, 
consequently, congressmen voting on bills without fully realizing the downside of 
their votes. These votes may well be cast differently if information presented were 
78 See THECAPITOL.NET, supra note 45 (“A temporary, ad hoc panel composed of 
House and Senate conferees that is formed for the purpose of reconciling differences in 
legislation that has passed both chambers.”).  
79 See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Things Fall Apart: A Constitutional Analysis of 
Legislative Exclusion, 55 EMORY L.J. 1, 11–12 (2006) (describing how a conference 
committee rewrote the 2003 Medicare bills, including reinserting the language previously 
rejected in floor votes); Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Eroding the Landscape, 
Eroding the Laws: Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental 
Laws, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 443–44 (1991) (“The bill went to the Senate 
Appropriations Energy-Water Subcommittee, where the second Tennessee senator, Jim 
Sasser, left the language intact. The full Senate voted to remove Duncan’s language from 
the bill, but after the conference committee concluded, the bill returned to the Senate with 
the Tellico exemption again present. The senators, now weary of the issue, voted to allow 
the dam to be completed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
80 See, e.g., id. at 11 (describing that the conference committee excluded not only the 
public, but even members of Congress with opposing viewpoints); Jameel Jaffer, Secret 
Evidence in the Investigative Stage: FISA, Administrative Subpoenas, and Privacy, 5 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 7, 15 (2006) (“The conference committee . . . 
[dealing with a Patriot Act reauthorization] met only once, and only so that members could 
deliver opening statements. ‘The rest of the work of the conference committee consists of 
Republican staff working behind the scenes to draft a compromise bill. . . . That is to say 
that the Republican staff of the Senate negotiated with the Republican staff of the House.’” 
(quoting Rep. Jerry Nadler)). 
81 See, e.g., Sher & Hunting, supra note 79, at 477–78.  
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more complete.82 That said, the linkage is not always true. It may well be that 
congressmen would vote the same way no matter how much information were 
available and how many people testified in front of their committee. Congressmen 
may aim to please their political supporters and discount the costs that such 
legislation may impose on the rest of society.83 Additional information or 
broadening the spectrum of participants in the legislative process is unlikely to 
change legislators’ basic incentives.84 What additional information may do, 
however, is focus congressmen’s attention on the broader effect that the legislation 
will have, beyond merely pleasing political allies. Once such effects are brought 
into focus, congressmen at least would have to justify their decision to ignore these 
effects, while the electorate will be able to pass judgment on whether such 
justifications withstand scrutiny. The next Part provides a glaring example of how 
these problems affect legislation and cause injury to the progress of science. 
 
III.  THE DICKEY-WICKER AMENDMENT 
 
A.  The Amendment and Its History 
 
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that the legislative process is 
either irreparably broken or that the process itself is worthless. Indeed, with respect 
to most matters addressed by the legislature, the legislative process works the way 
it is intended to. Much of what Congress does centers on value judgments about 
the appropriate role of government, level of taxation, proper foreign policy, etc.85 
82 See Kenneth C. Smurzynski, Modeling Campaign Contributions: The Market for 
Access and Its Implications for Regulation, 80 GEO. L.J. 1891, 1899 (1992). 
83 See Lindsay Warren Bowen, Jr., Note, Givings and the Next Copyright Deferment, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 821 (2008) (discussing Congress’s response to “small, 
politically powerful group of copyright holders,” despite the fact that such a response 
“harms society by allowing copyright holders to charge artificially high prices and by 
restraining the creation of new works based on copyrighted material”); Thomas O. 
Sargentich, The Future of the Item Veto, 83 IOWA L. REV. 79, 122 (1997) (“The electoral 
system is often singled out as the key source of relevant institutional incentives for 
politicians, given the assumption that the President and members of Congress will 
inevitably seek to reward the constituencies that elected them. . . . The pressure on 
members of Congress is particularly intense when the benefits of a governmental policy are 
concentrated and the costs are spread widely among members of the public, for in such 
cases, private interests have a strong motivation to organize to seek benefits.”). 
84 See Sargentich, supra note 83, at 122 (noting that because of reelection concerns, 
“members of Congress will inevitably seek to reward the constituencies that elected 
them”). 
85 George Jiang, Rain or Shine: Fair and Other Non-Infringing Uses in the Context of 
Cloud Computing, 36 J. LEGIS. 395, 395 (2010) (“[E]very statute encapsulates legislative 
value judgments regarding foreseeable situations at the time of enactment.”); see also Dr. 
Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Rise of Equality in International Law and its Pitfalls: Learning 
from Comparative Constitutional Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 38 (2010) (“Whether 
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In those circumstances, congressional majorities are primarily concerned with 
building public support for their proposed public policy solutions.86 In that posture, 
the “dog and pony” congressional hearings make perfect sense. The hearings there 
are not meant to illuminate the issues for debate, but rather to bolster the political 
support for (or to drum up opposition to) a preformulated political position.87 
Congress, in making its decisions, does have to rely on its understanding of 
the facts as they exist in the real world. When the facts are common or undisputed 
knowledge (e.g., the distance between two cities, the number of days in a year, or 
the revenues and expenditures of the government in the years past), there is not 
much danger that Congress will misunderstand the content, scope, or the import of 
the factual basis (though, of course, it may choose to assign whatever weight it 
chooses to these facts). However, when the facts concern complicated scientific 
issues requiring specialized knowledge for full comprehension, congressmen, 
usually untrained in science, are unlikely to fully understand either the predicate 
for their actions or the full effect that the actions will have.88 As a result, Congress 
often enacts laws that have a devastating effect on the speed and scope of scientific 
progress. It does so not out of any malice for scientific advances, but out of 
misunderstanding of the issues.  
The Dickey-Wicker Amendment (“DWA”)89 is a perfect example of Congress 
acting without understanding the full effect that the legislation would have on 
scientific exploration. Since 1974, federal law had already imposed restrictions on 
the use of federal funds with respect to fetal research.90 Those restrictions have 
been part and parcel of the abortion debate and legislative skirmishes.91 In the 
legislation is generally reasonable largely depends on value judgments that vary from 
nation to nation.”). 
86 See, e.g., Joseph A. Castelluccio III, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: Section 
404 and the Case for a Small Business Exemption, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 435–36 (2005) 
(“In order to enact effective securities regulation on the federal level, the Pecora Hearings 
sought to ‘galvanize[] broad public support for direct federal regulation of the stock 
markets.’” (alteration in original) (quoting JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 2 (3d ed. 2003)). 
87 See Castelluccio III, supra note 86, at 436. 
88 See, e.g., Alfred J. Cote, Jr., Who Tells Congress About Technology?, INDUS. 
RESEARCH, Sept. 1967, at 78, 80 (noting that scientists are “unable to translate their ideas 
into language that Congressmen understand”). 
89 Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996). 
90 See Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 213, 88 Stat. 342, 353 (1974) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 289I-1 (1978), repealed by Community Mental Health Centers 
Extension Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-622, § 302(b), 92 Stat. 3442 (1978) (limiting fetal 
research by prohibiting support for research on a living human fetus unless done for the 
survival of the fetus). 
91 See Gary L. Reback, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical 
Implications, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1207 (1974) (“Roe produced a rash of hastily 
prepared . . . statutes designed to prohibit the same type of fetal experimentation that had 
occurred prior to recent liberalized abortion laws.”). 
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1990s, however, as scientific horizons began to expand and the research began to 
focus on the earliest stages of human development, the ethical and political 
concerns over such research began to extend not just to fetal tissue, but also to 
embryonic tissue. The issue was studied by the National Institute of Health’s 
(“NIH”) Human Embryo Research Panel, composed of nineteen leading scientists 
and ethicists.92 The panel issued its report on September 27, 1994, and 
recommended making federal funding available for research using “spare” 
embryos, embryos obtained from consenting IVF patients, embryos created 
specifically for research, and research using parthenotes.93 This Part discusses the 
science of parthenotes and why the distinction is important, despite being 
overlooked by Congress. President Clinton declined to follow the recommendation 
in full, and under the executive order issued in 1994, federal funding was not made 
available for embryos created specifically for research.94 What is interesting about 
President Clinton’s executive order was that it was made after a period of study, 
comments, and a report by a body of experts.95 Nevertheless, the fact that the 
President did not fully endorse the recommendations of the expert panel does not 
diminish the importance of having had the benefit of the expert input. 
Congress, however, was not satisfied with President Clinton’s compromise. In 
response, in 1996, it enacted the DWA.96 The DWA prohibited funding for any 
research that involved “(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for 
research purposes; or (2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are 
destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death . . . .”97 The 
DWA defined “human embryo” as “any organism . . . that is derived by 
fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from one or more 
human gametes.”98 Although Congress, like the President, had access to the NIH 
92 See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, 
at vii–viii (1994), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/past_commissi 
ons/human_embryo_vol_1.pdf.  
93 Id. at xviii–xix. 
94 Debora Spar & Anna Harrington, Selling Stem Cell Science: How Markets Drive 
Law along the Technological Frontier, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 541, 556 (2007) (“On the very 
same day that the NIH approved the report, however, President Clinton issued an executive 
order forbidding the use of federal funds for embryo research in which embryos were 
created or destroyed.”). 
95 Id. 
96 See Rodriguez et al., supra note 26, at 24–25 (“The momentum for a more inclusive 
ban, however, began a month earlier, when, in the 1994 elections, Republicans regained 
control of both Congressional houses. For many of those elected, Clinton’s prohibition was 
not enough.”). 
97 Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 
(1996); see also Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 509, 123 Stat. 
524, 803 (prohibiting use of funds available under this appropriations act for the same 
purposes); Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. 109-149, § 509, 119 Stat. 2833, 2880 (2005).  
98 Balanced Budget Downpayment Act § 128; see also Omnibus Appropriations Act 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 509, 123 Stat. 524, 803 (including the “human diploid cells” 
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Report, there is no evidence that it ever considered the findings of the report or the 
distinctions drawn therein. The reason is that the DWA, because it was a “rider” on 
a must-pass appropriations bill,99 was never debated in any committee or on the 
floor. Instead, it was attached to a bill that resolved the “longest federal 
government shutdown in American history.”100 The entire Act was introduced, 
debated, and voted on in the House of Representatives in fewer than two and a half 
hours.101 The Senate considered the entirety of the bill, including three separate 
amendments (none of which dealt with embryonic research) and voted on it the 
next day.102 President Clinton signed it immediately upon the Senate’s passage.103 
This legislative rider has been reenacted every year since.104 As with the initial 
enactment, there is no evidence that the amendment was ever debated in any 
committee or on the floor of either house. 
The DWA and its restrictions became particularly salient in 1998 with the 
discovery of a successful method to isolate and grow human embryonic stem cells 
using cell culture.105 Embryonic stem cells are a potential treasure trove of future 
research and treatment.106 Three different presidents have had to issue 
contradictory statements on NIH funding of such research.107 The most recent NIH 
language); Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. 109-149, § 509, 119 Stat. 2833, 2880 (2005) 
(inserting the language “human diploid cells” after “human gametes”). 
99 See Omnibus FY96 Bill Ties Loose Ends, supra note 23, 10-19.  
100 See Rodriguez et al., supra note 26, at 25 (discussing the attachment of the DWA 
to the LHHS budget stalls). 
101 See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 25.  
102 See id. 
103 Id. 
104 Kiyan Bigloo, Aggregation of Powers: Stem Cell Research and the Scope of 
Presidential Power Examined Through the Lens of Executive Order Jurisprudence, 18 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 519, 523 (2012). 
105 See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 439, 483 (2003) (“The right-to-life versus scientific research fault-line surfaced again 
in debates over federal funding of embryonic stem cell research. That debate began in 1998 
when researchers at Johns Hopkins University and the University of Wisconsin developed 
ways to culture human embryonic stem cells indefinitely in the laboratory, opening the 
door to directing them to produce replacement tissue to treat disease.”). 
106 See id.; Shannon McGuire, Embryonic Stem Cells: Marrow of the Dickey Matter, 
11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 160, 160 (2010) (discussing the therapeutic potential of human 
embryonic stem cells).  
107 Compare Presidential Statement on Federal Funding of Research on Human 
Embryos, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2459 (Dec. 2, 1994) (statement by President 
Clinton refusing to allocate federal funds “to support the creation of human embryos for 
research purposes”), with Presidential Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research from 
Crawford, Texas, 37 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1149, 1151 (Aug. 9, 2001) (statement by 
President Bush allocating funds for limited human embryo research), and Exec. Order No. 
13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (2009) (President Obama’s order to remove restrictions and 
expand federal funding for embryo research). 
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policy, one enacted pursuant to President Obama’s executive order,108 has been 
challenged in courts as contravening DWA’s clear statutory language.109 The D.C. 
Circuit disagreed that the language was sufficiently clear to allow only one 
interpretation, thus permitting the challenged regulations to stand.110 The point is 
that because Congress never debated the DWA, it has never made a record as to 
what evils it was meant to prevent, leaving each administration somewhat free to 
adopt broad or narrow interpretation of the law and to fund or not fund various 
research projects. This, of course, is highly detrimental to the scientific 
community, which, as a result, is plagued by uncertainty over whether research 
will continue to be funded or whether the change in administration will result in a 
funding cutoff. With scientific progress dependent on long-term research projects, 
this state of affairs is hardly ideal. 
 
B.  The Science of Parthenotes 
 
The DWA is part of the perennial fight and debate over abortion and the 
question of when life actually begins.111 To be sure, these are not scientific issues 
and are not amenable to any falsifiable experimentation.112 As the U.S. Supreme 
Court pointed out, even “those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, 
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus” as to when life 
begins.113 In that sense, the DWA’s effect on science and scientific exploration is 
secondary to its proponents.114 Nonetheless, even those who espouse the view that 
life begins at conception and merits protection from that point in time do not 
generally take the view that research on any cell that contains the full complement 
of human chromosomes is improper.115 Indeed, opponents of abortion and 
embryonic research often tout research on human nonembryonic cells as a viable 
108 Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (2009). 
109 Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 393–94 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
110 Id. at 390, 396–97. 
111 See June Mary Zekan Makdisi, The Slide from Human Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research to Reproductive Cloning: Ethical Decision-Making and the Ban on Federal 
Funding, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 463, 475–78 (2003) (discussing the enactment of the Dickey-
Wicker Amendment as part of the effort to “to uphold the sanctity and intrinsic value of 
life, and to prevent the dehumanization and commodification of human life”). 
112 See Lauren R. Robbins, Open Your Mouth and Say ‘Ideology’: Physicians and the 
First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 183–86 (2009) (discussing lack of scientific 
consensus on the question of when life begins). 
113 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
114 See Makdisi, supra note 111, at 475 (“Congress voiced its response as a rider to 
the appropriations bill and made it clear that beneficence to the embryo rather than utility 
to the populace should be the governing value.”). 
115 See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, A Defense of Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 84 IND. L.J. 
1203, 1210 n.56 (2009) (discussing the support of various religious groups for adult stem 
cell research); James J. McCartney, Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Respect for Human 
Life: Philosophical and Legal Reflections, 65 ALB. L. REV. 597, 623–24 (2002) (noting that 
there is “little ethical debate” about the use of adult stem cells). 
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alternative to embryonic research.116 The reason for treating embryos (even single 
cell ones) differently from other cells with full chromosomal complement is the 
notion that embryos, given enough time and the right environment, can develop 
into full adult human organism, whereas other cells cannot do so. It is for this 
reason that the two sets of cells that would otherwise look nearly identical under 
the microscope are accorded a different moral status.117 The moral and 
philosophical aspects of this valuation, however, are undergirded by a purely 
factual scientific inquiry: Can this particular cell develop into an adult human 
organism? If so, then, and only then, does it stand on a higher moral plane.118 
Thus, in order to make that judgment, an individual needs to be familiar with the 
answers to certain basic scientific questions. Unfortunately, the Congress that 
enacted the DWA (and subsequent Congresses) never considered this issue when 
they enacted the broad funding prohibition that covered research on parthenotes.119 
Had Congress understood the nature and the science of parthenotes and 
parthenogenesis, the scope of the DWA may have well been narrower, and the 
effect on scientific exploration less pronounced.  
Parthenogenesis is a portmanteau120 derived from Greek parthenos, meaning 
virgin, and genesis, meaning birth.121 The term is used to denote asexual 
reproduction.122 Unlike sexual reproduction that involves the contribution of 
genetic materials from both an egg and a sperm, parthenogenesis involves 
contribution from the egg only.123 This form of reproduction is naturally occurring 
116 See id. 
117 See Allison C. Ayer, Stem Cell Research: The Laws of Nations and a Proposal for 
International Guidelines, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 393, 399 (2002) (“Proponents of th[e] view 
[that embryos have the same moral status as humans], including many Roman Catholics, 
believe that when genetic material is joined there is a unique potential for life, therefore the 
embryo holds independent moral status and should have the same rights that all living 
people have.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Heather Johnson Kukla, Note, 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Ethical Justification, 90 GEO. L.J. 503, 517–18 (2002) 
(stating that the reason for much of the opposition to embryonic research stems from the 
fact that “some view embryos as human persons with the same moral status as adults and 
children”).  
118 See id. (“Proponents believe that the embryo’s potential to develop into a human 
person confers upon it full moral status as a person . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
119 Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 
(1996). 
120 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND 
THERE 67 (Selwyn Hugh Goodacre & James Russell Kincaid eds., University of California 
Press 1983) (“You see it’s like a portmanteau—there are two meanings packed up into one 
word.”). 
121 Id.  
122 Erez Aloni, Symposium, From Page to Practice: Broadening the Lens for 
Reproductive and Sexual Rights: Cloning and the LGBTI Family: Cautious Optimism, 35 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 56 n.268 (2011). 
123 Rodriguez et al., supra note 26, at 21. 
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and is common to a number of invertebrate species.124 It is also present in all 
classes of vertebrates, excepting mammals.125 In nonmammals, this form of 
reproduction “can occur spontaneously (i.e., naturally) as a continuous 
reproductive strategy or as a response to environmental or nutritional changes.”126 
In mammals (of which humans are, of course, part), spontaneous parthenogenesis 
cannot result in a viable full-term offspring because this form of reproduction has 
been, evolutionary speaking, abandoned.127 Instead, when mammalian ova get 
spontaneously activated, they result not in an offspring, but in an ovarian tumor.128 
Thus, spontaneous parthenogenesis can occur in humans, but it is not a genesis or 
birth of a new life, but rather of cancerous lesions.129 
Parthenotes (defined as ova activated via parthenogenesis) also can be created 
in vitro “through chemical stimuli that mimic fertilization, but the lack of required 
genetic imprinting rules out further development.”130 These “activated” ova begin 
to divide as if they were fertilized, but the division is halted at an early stage of cell 
differentiation, eventually resulting in the death of the parthenote.131 Thus, human 
parthenotes, whether created spontaneously in vivo or during the course of an 
experiment in vitro, intrinsically are incapable of becoming viable human 
embryos.132 Their potential for developing into an adult organism is no greater than 
the potential of an unfertilized egg or a tumor cell. Yet, despite this obvious 
difference between parthenotes and embryos, the DWA treats them as one and the 
same, and it does so without anyone in Congress ever explicitly considering this 
difference.133 
While parthenotes are not a perfect research substitute for embryos, they do 
have their valuable uses. First, because parthenotes do involve the initial activation 
of an ovum, they can be used to study the early stages of pregnancy and embryonic 
development.134 For instance, it has been reported that implantation of fertilized 
eggs as part of Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) processes often fail 
because the egg activation process does not function properly.135 Studying the 
intricacies of that process would help perfect ART processes and ultimately lead to 







129 Id. at 22. 
130 Id. at 21. 
131 Id. at 24. 
132 Id. at 21. 
133 See Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996). 
134 Rodriguez et al., supra note 26, at 22. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
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Second, parthenotes are useful in studying miscarriages.137 Some research 
suggests that many miscarriages are due to the “very early loss of nonviable 
parthenotes caused by spontaneous egg activation in the female.”138 Identifying a 
biological marker that differentiates parthenotes from fertilized ova would help 
study the causes of miscarriage.139 
Third, parthenotes are useful in studying certain tumors.140 As mentioned 
previously, in mammals, spontaneous in vivo parthenogenesis leads not to an 
offspring, but to a gonadal tumor.141 Despite tremendous advances in knowledge 
about cancer causes and treatments, it is still one of the most complicated diseases 
from the viewpoint of its etiology, diagnosis, and progression, as well as its 
treatment.142 Any advances in understanding cancer processes, its diagnosis, and 
treatment would be valuable for the preservation of both extant human life, as well 
as potential human life, by helping to preserve fertility in the affected population. 
Finally, parthenotes may serve as a source of stem cells akin to those 
extracted from embryos.143 It is generally believed that stem cell research can lead 
to breakthrough advances in the understanding and treatment of spinal cord 
injuries, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson disease, and a number of other 
ailments.144 Whereas extraction of embryonic stem cells generally involves 
destroying an embryo, thus raising the concerns about the destruction of potential 
viable human life,145 extraction of similar stem cells from parthenotes avoids these 
concerns because, as discussed previously, human parthenotes are never viable and 
will not, under any circumstances, develop into an adult human.146 Thus, 
parthenotes can be a point of compromise between proponents of full federal 
funding for embryonic stem cell research and opponents of such funding. 
All of these advances are now precluded because of the broad language of the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment—a provision that was enacted with no debate and no 
understanding of the crucial biological differences between embryos and 
parthenotes. 
This Article does not take a specific position on the propriety of embryonic or 
parthenote research147 because the ultimate outcome of legislative debate is not 




140 Id.  
141 See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text. 
142 See Gina Kolata, In Long Drive to Cure Cancer, Advances Have Been Elusive, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at A1. 
143 Rodriguez et al., supra note 26, at 22. 
144 Molly Silfen, How Will California’s Funding of Stem Cell Research Impact 
Innovation? Recommendations for an Intellectual Property Policy, 18 HARV. J. LAW & 
TECH. 459, 468 (2005). 
145 Dolin, supra note 115, at 1215. 
146 See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text. 
147 For my views on the embryonic research, see generally Dolin, supra note 115. 
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counted, one side has to win, and the other has to lose. That has to happen even if 
there has been the most exhaustive and informative of debates. The point is not 
that the decision on the DWA necessarily should have been different either in 
whole or in part. It may very well be that even after hearing all of the arguments 
and scientific data differentiating parthenotes from embryos, Congress still would 
have enacted the DWA in its present form. One reason Congress could have done 
so is to create a “fence of protection” around human life, much like Talmudic 
scholars impose requirements on observant Jews that go beyond the bare minimum 
commands of the Torah, so as to make sure that the actual precepts are not 
violated.148 Second, it is quite possible that even given an identical set of facts, 
people of different political and religious persuasions, after viewing the facts 
through their own lens, will come to radically different conclusions as to what is 
the “right solution”149 and, therefore, choose not to fund parthenotes research. 
Third, it may well be that the political incentives of the DWA’s proponents are 
such that they weigh heavily towards voting for the broadest possible ban 
irrespective of the cost imposed on scientific progress.150  
Ultimately, what form a decision on the DWA would have taken and whether 
such decision would have been a good one from the perspective of public policy is 
not what concerns me. Rather, my argument is that the decision, whatever it is, 
must be made after the legislators are fully apprised of the scientific underpinnings 
of their proposals and the likely effect that the proposal would have on the progress 
of sciences. In this way, congressmen would understand the full implication of 
their actions, and the public would be able to judge those actions against the 
complete set of facts. The next Part suggests how to ensure that this informational 







148 See THE MISHNAH: A NEW TRANSLATION 672 (Jacob Neusner trans., 1988); 
Stephen J. Werber, Cloning: A Jewish Law Perspective with a Comparative Study of Other 
Abrahamic Traditions, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1114, 1114 n.1 (2000) (discussing the 
Talmudic principle specifically in the context of cloning debate). 
149 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public 
Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2006) (explaining the epistemic origins of political 
conflict arising from cultural commitments that are prior to factual beliefs on highly 
charged political issues). 
150 Nevertheless, the DWA was continued even when both chambers of Congress and 
the White House were controlled by the Democratic Party—the party generally less 
sympathetic to antiabortion and related legislation. Thus, it is unlikely that the Amendment 
can be explained purely by the desire of congressmen to please the politically allied 
antiabortion groups.  
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IV.  THE CONGRESSIONAL SCIENCE OFFICE AND LEGISLATIVE NOTICE AND 
COMMENT PROCESS  
 
A.  The Congressional Science Office 
 
As Part II previously discussed, there are three distinct, major problems with 
congressional decision making, especially when it affects science. First, there is a 
lack of an independent, nonpartisan forum for discussing and evaluating proposals. 
Second, there is a lack of sufficient training in the subject matter of proposals to 
fully understand their scope; and third, there is no meaningful ability for the public 
to contribute to the debate and discussion of the proposals. Thus, any system 
designed to fix the current flaws would necessarily have to address each of these 
shortcomings. Luckily, there are systems currently in place that can be used as 
models for addressing the shortcomings in congressional deliberations when it 
comes to scientific issues. Specifically, the role and function of the Congressional 
Budget Office is a useful point of departure in creating a nonpartisan body of 
experts to advise Congress on specific and technical matters for which 
congressmen themselves may not have full appreciation. 
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) was created in 1974 by the 
Congressional Budget Act to provide “independent analyses of budgetary and 
economic issues to support the Congressional budget process. The agency is 
strictly nonpartisan and conducts objective, impartial analysis . . . .”151 The CBO 
“produce[s] a formal cost estimate for nearly every bill that is ‘reported’ 
(approved) by a full committee of either House of Congress . . . .”152 The CBO also 
provides an annual report called “Budget and Economic Outlook,” which “includes 
projections of spending and revenues under current law over the next 10 years as 
well as an economic forecast . . . .”153 Thus, the CBO evaluates not only likely 
prospective effects of proposed legislation, but also yearly reevaluates the effect of 
current policy and estimates the effect of these policies if they are continued.154 
Finally, the CBO “prepares analytic reports at the request of the Congressional 
leadership or Chairmen or Ranking Minority Members of committees or 
subcommittees.”155 These reports analyze proposals that may or may not be in a 
form of a formal bill or amendment but help congressmen evaluate ideas that are 
being discussed either formally or informally.156 
In producing its reports, the CBO relies on the internal government data 
available from agencies like the Census Bureau, Federal Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Justice Statistics, etc.157 
151 CBO, INTRODUCTION, supra note 28, at 1.  
152 Id. at 6. 
153 Budget and Economic Outlook, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, https://cbo.gov/topics/bud 
get/budget-and-economic-outlook (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
154 CBO, INTRODUCTION, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
155 Id. at 6. 
156 Id. at 2, 9. 
157 See id. at 6.  
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Government agencies, however, are not the sole source of information for the 
CBO. A particularly interesting aspect of CBO’s operation is that it “seeks input 
from outside experts, including professors, analysts at think tanks, private-sector 
experts, and employees at various government agencies.”158 This input 
“complement[s] the knowledge and insights of . . . the agency’s staff.”159 
The CBO reports are not “binding” on Congress in a sense that an unfavorable 
CBO “score” (i.e., a report that projects that a given proposal would increase the 
deficit) does not preclude Congress from adopting the proposed bill.160 Indeed, 
Congress often votes to enact bills that increase the deficit.161 Nonetheless, the 
CBO reports are discussed during the committee and floor debates, as well as 
during election campaigns.162 As a result, the politicians, even when they 
ultimately decide to enact a law that is unfavorably scored by the CBO, must take 
that score into account and come up with coherent arguments as to why they voted 
the way they did.163 
Though there has been some criticism of the CBO’s methods,164 the CBO is 
generally viewed as a nonpartisan body, not beholden to either political party.165 
Indeed, despite the criticism leveled at the CBO, it is generally viewed as a neutral 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 
GEO. L.J. 1555, 1578 (2007) (“In principle, Budget Committee chairmen could ignore the 
CBO score or the Congress could amend its own rules or the Budget Act to allow the 
legislative amendment of a CBO score or to allow a PAYGO-violating measure to proceed 
without a supermajority.”). 
161 See, e.g., Gramm-Rudman-Hollings: Forgotten, But Not Yet Gone, 44 CONG. Q. 
WEEKLY REP. 2526, 2526 (1986) (“Despite the requirements [of the Gramm-Rudman Act], 
Congress took little notice of the CBO-OMB report.”). 
162 See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Wrangling Over Stimulus Is One-Sided So Far, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at A15 (noting the political effect of a CBO report on various 
stimulus proposals); Transcript of Debate Between Bush and Kerry, with Domestic Policy 
the Topic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at A22 (quoting Senator John Kerry relying on CBO 
scoring to criticize President George W. Bush’s Social Security reform plans). 
163 See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, The Fiscal Legacy of George W. Bush, N.Y. TIMES: 
ECONOMIX (June 12, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/the-f
iscal-legacy-of-george-w-bush/ (describing different political justifications used to support 
tax cuts enacted during the Bush Administration, despite the unfavorable CBO score).  
164 See, e.g., John W. Lee, Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains 
Contentions, 15 VA. TAX REV. 1, 72–73 (“Capital gains proponents have argued that both 
the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Congressional Budget Office have historically 
erred in calculating capital gains revenues. Opponents of dynamic scoring, on the other 
hand, argue that CBO estimates of revenue gains from new tax provisions have tended to 
err on the high side . . . . ” (footnote omitted)); Westmoreland, supra note 160, at 1574 
(stating “work done by the CBO is credible and subject to intense review and criticism by 
interested parties . . . . ”). 
165 See Robert W. Hahn, Achieving Real Regulatory Reform, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
143, 153 (noting that the CBO “has a reputation for impartiality”). 
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arbiter of budgetary disputes166 (even if certain political actors disagree with the 
underlying methodology).167 The CBO’s estimates are often the centerpiece of 
political and campaign debates, and members of both parties rely on them to tout 
their own agenda or to criticize their opponents’ plans.168 The CBO ensures that it 
remains a neutral arbiter (and is perceived as such) by limiting the political 
activities of its staff,169 requiring that the Speaker of the House and President pro 
tempore of the Senate appoint the Director of the Office after consultations with 
the members of the committees having jurisdiction over the budgetary matters,170 
giving the Director a fixed four-year term (irrespective of the political vicissitudes 
of the individuals originally responsible for the Director’s appointment),171 and 
seeking input from a variety of outside experts.172 Additionally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the CBO makes no policy recommendations to Congress.173 Instead, 
the CBO’s role is limited to evaluating and scoring congressional policy 
proposals.174  
The CBO model is a good starting point for the creation of a system that 
would illuminate and evaluate congressional proposals that would have an effect 
on the progress of sciences. If Congress had a Congressional Science Office with a 
mission similar to that of a CBO, except on matters of science, the debates over 
legislation having impact on scientific progress would be better informed and more 
substantive. Indeed, there used to exist a similar congressional office. From 1972 
to 1995, the Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”) produced studies on a 
wide range of topics from acid rain, to payment for physician services, to wood 
use.175 The new Republican majority abolished the OTA in 1995 as part of the 
166 Id.  
167 Westmoreland, supra note 160, at 1574 (“The near-constant carping by dissatisfied 
members of Congress, interest groups, or journalists that the CBO estimates are ‘wrong’ 
misses the point of the exercise. The CBO score is deemed to be correct by the agreements 
on how the budget process is to work, and all legislative rules and actions follow from it.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
168 See Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1426 (2011) (“Congress created the Congressional Budget Office 
and required the CBO to calculate the costs incurred over a four year period by each bill or 
joint resolution reported by any committee of the House or Senate. . . . The point of these 
disclosure requirements was to furnish Congress with detailed information concerning the 
budget consequences of proposed legislation so that its budget consequences form part of 
the legislative debate, and to provide an external measure of the budget consequences of 
enacted legislation.”); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
169 CBO, INTRODUCTION, supra note 28, at 12. 
170 Id. at 4. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 6. 
173 Id. at 7. 
174 See id. 
175 For an exhaustive list of OTA publications, searchable by topic, see generally OTA 
Publications, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT ARCHIVE, http://ota.fas.org/otareports/ (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2014); see also Albert C. Lin, Technology Assessment 2.0 Revamping Our 
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Contract with America.176 The abolition of the office was criticized at the time,177 
and there have been calls to resurrect it.178 A resurrected OTA would indeed be a 
good point of departure. However, the “new OTA,” or Congressional Science 
Office (“CSO”), should have a somewhat different mission from the original OTA.  
The original Office prepared reports on scientific issues of the day but without 
being tied to any specific legislation.179 Such reports are certainly useful as 
background information and as prods for Congress to act on issues that they might 
not have otherwise considered. Nonetheless, for individuals lacking scientific or 
technical training (like most congressmen),180 applying the background 
information to the specific legislative proposals is often just as difficult as 
acquiring the background knowledge in the first place.181 For that reason, the re-
created office would be more effective if its reports were directed to specific 
legislative proposals, rather than general scientific issues that may be of interest to 
Congress and the country. On a related note, an office that chooses on its own 
which subject matters to report is more open to the accusation of political bias.182 
Even when the science found in the report is sound and the conclusions drawn are 
true, the very act of selecting on which topics to report—and, therefore, highlight 
in the public’s mind—and which to omit may create an impression that certain 
issues are being given more importance for political reasons.183 That is especially 
Approach to Emerging Technologies, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1332 (outlining the 
circumstances that led to the OTA being dissolved). Technically, Congress did not 
“abolish” the OTA, but it cut off all funding to the Office. See Legislative Branch 
Appropriations Act 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-53, § 112, 109 Stat. 514, 525–26 (1995). 
176 Lin, supra note 175, at 1332. 
177 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and 
(Breach of) the Contract with America: Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying 
Environmental Protection?, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 19 (1996) (criticizing elimination 
of the OTA). 
178 See, e.g., Lin, supra note 175, at 1340–41; Rush Holt, Op-Ed, Reversing the 
Congressional Science Lobotomy, WIRED (Apr. 29, 2009, 10:40 AM), http://www.wired. 
com/wiredscience/2009/04/fromthefields-holt/. 
179 2 U.S.C. § 472(c) (2006) (stating that “[t]he basic function of the Office shall be to 
provide early indications of the probable beneficial and adverse impacts of the applications 
of technology and to develop other coordinate information which may assist the 
Congress”); id. § 472(d) (giving the Office itself the authority to decide what issues to 
explore and report).  
180 See Dean, supra note 3. 
181 See Jon M. Peha, Science and Technology Advice for Congress: Past, Present, and 
Future, 24 RENEWABLE RESOURCES J. 19, 21 (2006), available at http://repository.cmu.edu 
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=epp (noting that in order to be useful to 
Congress, information must be in a format that “Congress can readily understand and 
apply”). 
182 See, e.g., id. at 20–22 (discussing accusations of bias lobbed at the Office of 
Technology Assessment and stating that “[t]he most likely way for bias to arise is in the 
selection of issues to be investigated”).  
183 See id. 
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true when the issues are fairly politically sensitive.184 On the other hand, when the 
CSO reports on every bill that has passed the committee of jurisdiction, as well as 
on any requests that are made of it by the Chairman and the Ranking Member of 
relevant committees, the CSO itself cannot be accused of picking and choosing 
which issues to highlight. Instead, they merely would be a responsive body, 
helping Congress understand both the scientific background in the relevant area 
and the likely impact of the proposed legislation. It would, however, remain 
entirely up to Congress whether and how much weight to give to these reports. 
What Congress would not be able to avoid is the debate over the actual merits of 
the proposed legislation, either in the halls of Congress or on the campaign trail. 
Additionally, the CSO—much like the CBO—would report not only on 
pending bills, but also provide a year-end report on how the bills previously 
enacted have actually worked in the real world. Educated predictions as to the 
effect that legislation will have are certainly a valuable tool for legislators to 
decide how to vote on a pending bill, but reporting and evaluating actual effects 
will help legislators decide whether to renew expiring legislation and will also 
serve as an annual self-check on the CSO itself. By cross-checking its predictions 
with actual outcomes, the CSO will be better able to fine-tune its evaluative 
function and insulate itself from any charges of partisanship.  
 
B.  The Legislative Notice and Comment Process 
 
The creation of a Congressional Science Office, charged with evaluating 
proposed legislation for impact on science in the same manner that the CBO 
evaluates proposed legislation for its impact on the budget, would solve the first 
problem with current congressional decision making in the scientific arena: the 
lack of an independent, nonpartisan forum for discussing and evaluating proposals. 
However, two additional problems would remain—the lack of sufficient training in 
the subject matter of proposals to fully understand their scope185 and the lack of 
meaningful ability for the public to contribute to the debate and discussion of the 
proposals.186 Of course, the staff of the CSO would have to have scientific, 
technical, or engineering training—much like the staff of the CBO must have 
training in economics. However, with scientific knowledge proliferating and 
progressing at an incredible pace, it would be quite hard to hire enough people to 
cover all possible fields of scientific exploration. Even if such coverage were 
possible, it is likely that the knowledge of the Office’s staff would grow stale with 
time. 
Thus, the mere existence of the CSO and quality staff, while going a long way 
to improving the understanding of the scope and effect of the legislative proposals, 
would still be insufficient to keep up with the emerging or rapidly changing 
184 Id. at 21 (stating that much criticism was directed at the OTA following its 
negative review of the Strategic Defense Initiative—a top Republican priority). 
185 See Holt, supra note 178. 
186 See supra notes 39, 54–56 and accompanying text. 
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technologies. The CSO would have to look beyond its own internal expertise. This 
Article has already discussed that the CBO does just that by seeking input of 
independent experts of various political stripes in making its projections.187 While 
that approach is laudable, it is not sufficient in the context of evaluating the impact 
of legislation on scientific progress. Furthermore, if the CSO were able to pick its 
own experts—especially on highly charged issues (e.g., embryonic research, global 
warming, human subject research, etc.)—it could be open to the accusation of bias 
in its selection.188 If such an outcome were to come to pass, it would undermine the 
legitimacy of the CSO and its evaluations. Thus, in my view, the participation in 
evaluating the impact of proposed legislation on matters of science should be 
broader. Broader engagement would also address the current lack of meaningful 
opportunity for the public to participate in the shaping of legislative decisions. The 
question is how does one achieve broad participation that results in informative 
and valuable input into the ultimate product—the CSO’s formal evaluation of 
legislative proposals? 
One way to involve the interested and informed public in crafting legal 
language has been successfully tried in the administrative arena. The 
Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 (“APA”)189 required agencies to give 
notice to the public on proposed rules, to allow the public to comment on the 
proposal, and to consider the comments before issuing a final rule. “[N]otice-and-
comment rulemaking provides several interrelated benefits. It allows all 
stakeholders in a regulatory decision to be heard before a decision is made and 
ensures that the agency responds to relevant comments.”190 As the Fourth Circuit 
very recently pointed out,  
 
The important purposes of this notice and comment 
procedure cannot be overstated. The agency benefits from the 
experience and input of comments by the public, which help 
ensure informed agency decisionmaking. The notice and comment 
procedure also is designed to encourage public participation in the 
administrative process. Additionally, the process helps ensure that 
the agency maintains a flexible and open-minded attitude towards 
its own rules, because the opportunity to comment must be a 
meaningful opportunity.191 
 
187 CBO, INTRODUCTION, supra note 28, at 6. 
188 In other words, the focus of bias would move from the level of congressional 
committees to the level of CSO. 
189 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 5 U.S.C.). 
190 Michael Kolber, Rulemaking Without Rules: An Empirical Study of Direct Final 
Rulemaking, 72 ALB. L. REV. 79, 86 (2009). 
191 N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 763 (4th Cir. 
2012) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The agency, of course, “need not respond to every comment so long as it 
responds in a reasoned manner to significant comments received.”192 In other 
words, the agency must simply show that it has considered the views of the public 
and came to a reasoned decision, even if that decision is contrary to views 
expressed in the comments.193 This process has been found to be so successful that 
there have been calls to export it beyond America’s borders.194 However, the 
successes of the notice-and-comment procedure can be applied on the home front 
as well by transplanting it to the legislative arena. 
Once a bill or proposal is referred to the CSO for an evaluation and report, the 
CSO would identify provisions that would potentially have an impact on scientific 
progress. It would then invite public comments on those provisions. Those most 
familiar with the underlying science, as well as the likely effect that the proposed 
legislation will have on the research in the field, would be able to convey their 
understanding to the CSO via a formal comment. Furthermore, because the 
comments would be open to the public at large (and not just to select scientists), 
comments would also be made centering on ethical implications of the legislative 
enactments or the research itself. In that way, the CSO would be able to present a 
full range of views of the scientific community, including any concerns raised 
about the propriety of certain methods and avenues of research. The CSO would 
serve as an aggregator and a filter for this commentary by evaluating, compiling, 
and summarizing it in a language accessible for the congressmen. It is Congress, 
however, that will ultimately decide what weight, if any, to give to the concerns 
and critique of the individuals and groups that have commented on the proposed 
legislation. 
Of course, the process would not be identical to that in the administrative 
agencies. Administrative agencies’ rules and actions can be judicially set aside for 
failure to follow the proper notice-and-comment procedure or for failure to 
consider comments submitted.195 No such sanction could be imposed on Congress 
if it or its own advisory body failed to fully consider the concerns of the public. 
After all, unlike administrative agencies that have only whatever authority 
delegated to them by Congress, Congress itself retains sovereign authority to enact 
whatever laws it deems fit (subject only to the constitutional constraints on its 
power).196 Nonetheless, though the courts would not be in a position to invalidate 
congressional laws as “inadequately considered or debated,” the legislative notice 
and comment will still have a salutary and constraining function. 
192 U.S. Satellite Broad. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1177, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
193 See Rodway v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 816–17 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
194 See generally Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European 
Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 451 (1999) (proposing that the European Community incorporate the basic features of 
United States notice and comment). 
195 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (2006) (stating that courts shall set aside agency actions 
that were arrived at “without observance of procedure required by law”). 
196 Cf. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671–72 (1892) (holding that once Congress 
attests that the bill was properly passed, the judiciary will not inquire into the procedures). 
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First, the notice-and-comment process will, of necessity, slow down some 
legislative activity because some time will have to be allocated to actually receive 
and evaluate the comments. Though it is true that Congress has not been a bastion 
of rapid and efficient decision making, an additional brake on legislation that may 
have a far-reaching negative impact on science, technology, and medicine is a 
positive thing. As Professor Lazarus points out, oftentimes slowing down such 
laws simply preserves the legislative and legal status quo197—stability that is 
usually beneficial for scientific progress.198 
Second, by combining broader public participation with the reasoned 
responses both from other members of the public submitting responsive comments, 
as well as from the CSO, the notice-and-comment mechanism will lead to a 
broader acceptance of the legislative outcome.199 By giving individuals a real voice 
in the legislative process, Congress will help grow confidence that, at least with 
respect to issues that turn on objective understanding of scientific realities and 
definitions, it has considered and properly weighed the objective evidence, even if 
a particular individual disagrees with the weight assigned to his or her own 
comments and arguments.200 Additionally, under an open notice-and-comment 
regime, the CSO is less likely to be lobbied or captured by special interest groups. 
If the CSO, like an administrative agency, is required by its rules to “respond[] in a 
reasoned manner to significant comments received,”201 it will be less likely that a 
few influential individuals or groups would be able to sway the Office’s views. 
Indeed, to the extent necessary, the Office can make the comments anonymous 
(beyond the educational and experience qualifications) so as to not be swayed by 
any personal connections or partisan leanings of the commenter. The fact that the 
CSO would not offer any policy prescriptions, but will limit itself only to 
analyzing legislation, will further insulate it from the danger of capture.  
Third, and related to the second point, the ignoring of clear and specific 
criticisms and warnings issued by a neutral, nonpartisan body would serve as good 
fodder for intracongressional criticism, as well as campaign commercials. Much 
like candidates are now consistently criticized in campaign ads for disregarding the 
opinion of the CBO and voting for additional spending or tax cuts that have been 
scored as adding to the deficit,202 so too will candidates be criticized for adopting 
legislation that the CSO warned would lead to slowing of scientific progress. This 
will be an especially potent tool if in its “progress reports,” the CSO reconfirms its 
initial predictions. 
197 Lazarus, supra note 73, at 634–35. 
198 See id. at 634 (“The absence of legislative action does not create a disruptive legal 
vacuum.”). 
199 See Lin, supra note 175, at 1329–30. 
200 See John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 233, 250 (1989) (arguing that fair policy-making processes tend to increase 
public acceptance of results). 
201 U.S. Satellite Broad. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1177, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
202 See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, to the extent the courts consider the “legislative history” of any 
particular enactment, especially when applying the Chevron analysis203 to the 
administrative interpretations of the law (as was the case with Sherley v. 
Sebelius204) or when attempting to figure out whether a particular interpretation 
would be an “absurd result,” subject to the rule of the Church of the Holy 
Trinity,205 the CSO reports would be of tremendous help. Courts will actually be 
able to see whether Congress was warned of the “absurd results” and whether it 
enacted legislation despite such warnings.206 Similarly, the courts (and 
administrative agencies) will be able to better evaluate whether the language and 
intent of the statute is indeed ambiguous or whether the particular problem, in all 
its details, was considered by Congress and a definitive decision reached. 
 
C.  The Criticisms and a Response 
 
Had the proposed notice and comment followed by a full CSO report 
procedure been in place in 1996, the DWA may have encountered a different fate, 
though there are no guarantees that it would necessarily have been so. On one 
hand, it is true that the legislative vehicle to which the DWA was attached was 
considered, voted on, enacted by Congress, and signed by the President in fewer 
than forty-eight hours, thus leaving very little time for any, much less exhaustive, 
debate on the riders attached to the bill.207 Furthermore, given the “must-pass” 
nature of the bill and the background of the government shutdown that the bill was 
attempting to resolve, there was likely no appetite to debate the particulars. 
Thus, the first objection is that it is unlikely that the process this Article 
proposes would have had much impact at that initial stage. Indeed, this criticism 
can be generalized to argue that the proposed process is unlikely to solve many 
problems and will accomplish little more than creating another government 
bureaucracy that will succeed only in the proliferation of reports that no one reads. 
While certainly the proposal is not a panacea to legislation gratuitously injurious to 
the progress of science, it is an improvement over the current process. In the case 
of the DWA, though Congress attached the rider to an emergency, must-pass bill, it 
does not mean that (a) the proposed system would have had no impact at all on the 
likelihood of DWA being enacted or (b) the DWA would have continued to 
survive, essentially unchanged, to the present day. 
It is certainly the case that when operating under exceedingly narrow time 
constraints, the proposed CSO would not be able to engage in a full-blown notice-
203 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
204 644 F.3d 388, 394–97 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
205 143 U.S. 457, 459–60 (1892). 
206 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 510 (2d Cir. 1984) (Cardamone, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that despite the majority’s view that a different outcome would lead 
to “absurd results,” “[t]he legislative branch fully considered the possibility of [such 
results] and took that risk advisedly”). Judge Cardamone’s view was vindicated by the 
Supreme Court. See Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486–88 (1985). 
207 See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text. 
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and-comment period, analysis of comments received, and creation of a 
comprehensive report for congressmen to debate and consider. But such situations 
arise presently both in Congress and also in the administrative agencies. The CBO 
often has to work under very tight time constraints to produce cost estimates for 
last-minute budgetary compromises.208 Perhaps such reports are not as 
comprehensive as the reports that allow for more detailed study, broader 
consultations, and deeper reflection. But such reports are still given significant 
weight by congressmen and, eventually, the electorate. There is no reason to 
believe that the CSO would be unable to produce its own reports and estimates on 
an expedited basis, even if in those cases they would have to forgo the notice-and-
comment mechanism. Similarly, administrative agencies also occasionally issue 
rules and regulations without engaging in the notice-and-comment process. The 
APA permits agencies to forego the process in “emergency situations.”209 This 
exception recognizes that though notice and comment is important, agencies do 
have their own expertise and can, in exceptional circumstances, be allowed to rely 
on that expertise alone.210 These exceptions are generally permitted only when the 
promulgated rule is temporary, with the permanent rule subject to the full scope of 
the APA procedures.211 
208 For example, the estimate for the “fiscal cliff” budget compromise was prepared 
on January 1, the very same day the Senate passed the bill. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, ESTIMATE OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF H.R. 8, THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER RELIEF 
ACT OF 2012 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachmen 
ts/American%20Taxpayer%20Relief%20Act.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). The actual 
text of the bill was only agreed upon the previous day. See Bill Summary & Status, 112th 
Congress (2011–2012), H.R. 8, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR00008:@@@X (last visited Feb. 28, 2014); see also 158 CONG. 
REC. S8592 (Dec. 31, 2012) (amendment by Senator Reid to strike all previously 
considered text and substitute the text of the amendment).  
209 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2006) (permitting an agency to forego the notice-and-
comment process “when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public 
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest”); 
Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 713 F.2d 795, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(holding that promulgation of an order without notice-and-comment procedures under 5 
U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) is proper only if the agency concludes there is an “emergency 
situation[] wh[ere] delay would do real harm”). 
210 See Robert Orsi, Emergency Exceptions from NEPA: Who Should Decide?, 14 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 481, 507 (1987) (noting that in a situation where emergency 
environmental regulations are called for, the relevant agency would “exercise its own 
expertise in environmental matters”).  
211 Am. Fed’n of Govt. Emps., AFL-CIO v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1157–58 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (“[A]ny administrative action taken in a rare ‘emergency’ situation . . . need only be 
temporary, pending public notice-and-comment procedures. . . . [O]nce an emergency 
situation has been eased by the promulgation of interim rules, it is crucial that the 
comprehensive permanent regulations which follow emerge as a result of the 
congressionally-mandated policy of affording public participation . . . .”). 
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Likewise, legislative riders on annual appropriations bills remain in effect 
only for so long as the underlying bill does, and because annual appropriations 
bills never last more than a year, neither do restrictions contained therein. Thus, 
though the initial restriction may have been enacted under emergency 
circumstances leaving no time for full public participation in the CSO process, 
nothing would prevent the CSO to conduct a full notice-and-comment procedure in 
anticipation of the rider potentially being renewed in a subsequent year. In 
emergency circumstances similar to the ones that attended the passage of the 
DWA, the initial report would potentially be truncated and somewhat superficial. 
In the long term, however, the process would still provide the benefits that this 
Article previously identifies. Relatedly, the CSO would be charged not just with 
making reports on pending bills, but also year-end estimates on the effect of all 
statutes presently in force (as they relate to science and technology). Thus, even if 
there were no opportunity to provide notice and comment at the time of a bill’s 
initial consideration, there would still be an opportunity to comment on how the 
now-enacted bill has actually affected the progress of sciences, thus permitting 
Congress to reconsider the bill’s scope when it comes up for reauthorization. Had 
this process been in place, the public would have had over a dozen annual 
opportunities to comment on the scope and effect of the DWA and explain the 
difference between parthenotes and embryos. Congress, presented with a formal 
report from the CSO would then have an opportunity to debate and rethink the 
renewal of the Amendment as originally written. Of course, Congress may well 
have remained unpersuaded, but at least congressmen would have to justify their 
approach to each other and/or their constituents. 
The second objection to the proposed system—one that also casts doubt on 
the proposition that had the system been in place the DWA would have likely 
encountered a different fate—is that there are already ways for Congress to obtain 
detailed reports on matters of science and that an additional report-producing body 
would do little to change the legislative dynamic. After all, the National Institute of 
Health’s Human Embryo Research Panel did issue a two-volume report on 
embryonic research, and that report did discuss the difference between parthenotes 
and embryos,212 yet Congress enacted the DWA anyway. This Article readily 
concedes that Congress could ignore the reports of the CSO just like it ignored the 
report of the Human Embryo Research Panel. However, the adoption of the 
Article’s proposed system would not be simply duplicative of existing resources 
and advisory bodies. 
This Article again refers to the CBO. By the time the Congressional Budget 
Act created the CBO, the Office of Management and Budget had been in existence 
for over half a century.213 Yet, Congress saw it fit to establish its own independent 
nonpartisan office. Though the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) is 
212 See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 92, at 61. 
213 See Michael J. Wieser, Beyond Bowsher: A Separation of Powers Approach to the 
Delegation of Budgetary Authority, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1990). 
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well respected, it is viewed as more partisan than the CBO.214 It is now the CBO, 
not its older sibling the OMB, which has grown to be an authoritative arbiter on 
budgetary matters.215 Perhaps this stems from the fact that Congress is by its very 
nature bipartisan (even when a single party has a majority in both chambers), and 
therefore, each party has to try to accommodate the other to a certain extent, 
whereas the presidency is, of necessity, unipartisan, and the President need not 
accommodate anyone in selecting those of his advisors that are not subject to 
Senate confirmation. The same dynamic is likely to play out with the CSO. 
Though Presidents have had various bodies advising them on scientific and 
bioethical issues since 1974, each President has changed the scope and the focus of 
these commissions, thus giving the commissions a flavor of partisanship and 
allegiance to the appointing administration’s priorities.216 In contrast, the proposed 
CSO would be charged with reporting on every bill having potential impact on 
science and technology, thus avoiding the perception that it is focusing on issues 
favored by a particular party or individual. Furthermore, the various presidential 
commissions were designed to recommend a specific course of action. Indeed, the 
present Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues was created 
explicitly to “offer[] practical policy options,” to the administration.217 
Commissions with such charge can be perceived as having a stake in the political 
outcome rather than serving as a neutral evaluator of congressional proposals. That 
posture necessarily makes these bodies partisan, even if not in the traditional 
Republican or Democratic sense. Such a perception would undermine the value of 
the body to Congress and, therefore, to the legislative process. 
Moreover, there is another reason that a Congress-based body for evaluating 
scientific issues is preferable to that based in the Executive Branch. As 
Congressman Rush Holt pointed out,  
 
Congress needs access to unbiased technical and scientific 
assessments finished in a time frame appropriate for Congress, 
written in a language that is understood by members of Congress, 
and crafted by those who are familiar with the functions of 
Congress.  
. . . . 
214 See Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, 
Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 761 n.267 (1986) (stating 
that members of both parties view the OMB as more partisan and more “likely to distort its 
projections of the budget deficit in accordance with the chief executive’s wishes”); Alan 
Fram, Despite GOP Laughter, Congress’ Budget Office Gets High Marks With PM-CBO 
vs. OMB Numbers, AP NEWS ARCHIVE (Feb. 21, 1993), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/19 
93/Despite-GOP-Laughter-Congress-Budget-Office-Gets-High-Marks-With-PM-CBO-vs-
OMB-Numbers/id-0cdd51362adc82226be3ecd79e86c657. 
215 See Entin, supra note 214. 
216 See Nicholas Wade, Obama Plans to Replace Bush’s Bioethics Panel, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2009, at A24. 
217 Id. 
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[M]embers of Congress do not suffer from a lack of information, 
[but they] lack time and resources to assess the validity, 
credibility, and usefulness of the large amount of scientific 
information and advice [they] receive as it affects actual policy 
decisions. The purpose of the [former Office of Technology 
Assessment] was to assist members of Congress in this task. It 
both provided an important long-term perspective and alerted 
Congress to scientific and technological components of policy that 
might not be obvious.218 
 
Simply put, scientific advisors based in the Executive Branch (or independent 
of political branches altogether) are not ideal because they are insufficiently 
familiar with congressional procedures, schedules, and language to serve 
congressional needs. Furthermore, what Congress needs is not merely the ability to 
find general information on a particular topic. That is easy enough to do. What 
Congress needs is an evaluation of the likely effect a specific bill is likely to have 
on scientific progress. Indeed, though the Human Embryo Research Panel 
discussed the nature of parthenotes, it did not discuss why the prohibition on the 
use of parthenotes might present significant problems. Thus, congressmen, even if 
they had read the Human Embryo Research Panel’s report, would not have 
appreciated the full effect of the DWA. 
Finally, though the various presidential commissions have done an admirable 
job soliciting views of a broad range of scientists, ethicists, patients, and others, 
they still lack the formal notice-and-comment format that this Article proposes. 
The formal notice-and-comment mechanism with an invitation to participate 
extended to every interested individual, rather than just to those that the 
commission finds to be worthy of attention, will improve both the legislative 
process itself and the public perception of and confidence in the process. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Mark Twain once quipped, “suppose you were an idiot. And suppose you 
were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself.”219 This Article is somewhat less 
cynical about Congress. One of its real problems, among others, is not idiocy, but 
lack of digestible, objective, and timely information on complex scientific and 
technical issues. In today’s political environment where even scientific issues are 
politicized and the public trust in legislators is at an all-time low,220 we sorely need 
a mechanism that provides unbiased assessment of legislative proposals while 
increasing public participation in the legislative process, diminishing the influence 
218 Holt, supra note 178 (emphasis added). 
219 2 ALBERT BIGELOW PAINE, MARK TWAIN, A BIOGRAPHY: THE PERSONAL AND 
LITERARY LIFE OF SAMUEL LANGHORNE CLEMENS 724 (Harper & Brothers 1912). 
220 Elizabeth Mendes & Joy Wilke, Americans’ Confidence in Congress Falls to 
Lowest on Record, GALLUP (Jun. 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163052/americans 
-confidence-congress-falls-lowest-record.aspx.  
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of special interests, and educating legislators on the complex scientific and 
technical issues. An independent, nonpartisan, CSO modeled on the CBO, which 
would provide an opportunity for the experts and public at large to weigh in with 
comments on the likely effect of the proposed bills on scientific issues and would 
evaluate these comments and produce reports “written in a language that is 
understood by members of Congress, and crafted by those who are familiar with 
the functions of Congress,”221 would go a long way toward improving the 
legislative process and reducing damage that haphazardly considered legislation 
can inflict on scientific progress. Therefore, creating a legislative notice-and-
comment process would improve legislation and public confidence and would have 
beneficial effects on science. While Congress may not always defer to the concerns 
raised by the commenters or the staff at the CSO, the improved quality of 
congressional debates—and the increased accountability that will come with 
forcing Congress to confront explicit warnings of the scientific community—will 
be a marked improvement over the current process of legislating in matters of 
science and technology. 
  
221 Holt, supra note 178 (emphasis added).  
                                                     
